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INTRODUCTION

The extremely rapid emergence of the Internet as a mass communications
service and its concomitant commercialization have stirred great interest in
creating a broadband' infrastructure, both in the United States and
worldwide. The concept of a national, even global, network linking citizens
and governments, friends and neighbors, customers and firms, and schools
and students appears new and exciting, almost unprecedented to many.

* Professor, Public Policy and Management Department, Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. I wish to thank the Annenberg School's Public
Policy Center for their financial support for this project. I have also benefited from comments
Internet: faulby Christiaan Hogendom, Wharton School, on an earlier draft.
haber@wharton.upenn.edu; WWW: rider.wharton.upenn.edu/-faulhabe.
1. I use the term "broadband" to refer to an electronic signal (or to the facilities designed
to transmit that signal) that carries information substantially greater than a voice signal, for
example, video or high-speed data. For the more engineering oriented, I consider Integrated
Services Digital Network (ISDN) to be more than voice, but less than broadband. Generally,
a useful if not wholly accurate benchmark would be signals of 10 Mhz or above. Note that
modem compression technologies may eventually permit the practical carriage of such signals
across telephone lines that were originally designed for voice.
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Whether this will occur, and how it will play out, is a great uncertainty.
In fact, networks are nothing new. "Hard" networks, such as road and
rail systems, power grids, and water and gas distribution networks have been
with us for a century. These networks connect customers to suppliers, or
other customers, with physical facilities. "Soft" networks, such as computer
hardware and software, and automobile service and parts systems, depend
upon shared standards and protocols to link products and their uses and are
a barely noticed part of our lives. Telecommunications networks have also
been with us for a century, from early telephone networks, local in scope, to
the emergence of the current globally connected telephone system. In the
1920s, radio networks emerged, followed by television networks in the 1940s
and 1950s. Somewhat later, cable television networks grew, slowly at first,
but now passing over 90% of U.S. homes. 2 In other countries, satellite
television distribution networks perform much the same role. More recently,
cellular telephone networks have also grown, illustrating the point that
telecommunications networks, though "hard" in the sense used above, can be
wireless links, without a continuous physical connection.
In this broader network context, why the sudden interest in broadband
networks, and what is unique about them? For those familiar with this
technology, the surprise is that it took so long. Engineers and communications specialists have been predicting the coming of broadband
systems with both confidence and regularity over the last thirty years. There
have been numerous "false dawns," such as teletext and videotext, and more
successfully, Minitel3 in France. However, despite the enthusiasm of
engineers and telephone companies, consumers did not have a question to
which broadband data networks were the answer.
But given the rich context of existing telecommunications networks, what
is so special and unique about broadband data networks? The fact that they
are broadband is nothing special; coaxial cable and broadcast television are
broadband. However, both these media are inherently one-way; they are
designed to carry video content from a producer of that content to customers.
Recent attempts to refit cable systems for two-way traffic, though successful,
reinforce the point that this system was designed to deliver a specific
product, and attempts to modify it are quite costly. These are specialized
systems. The fact that broadband networks are interactive is also nothing

2. 1995 FCC SECOND ANN. REP. ON CABLE COMPETITION 2 app. B, tbl.1.

3. Minitel is a network of service providers and home/office "boxes" for accessing these
providers that France Telecom started to deploy in 1982. Although still essentially limited to
France, it has expanded substantially, now encompassing 7 million users and 26,000 services.
See generally Jack Kessler, The French Minitel: Is There Digital Life Outside of the "US
ASCII" Internet? A Challenge or Convergence?, D-LiB MAG. § 2.0 (Dec. 1995)
<http://www.dlib.org/dlib/december95/12kessler.html>.
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special; the telephone network has been two-way for a hundred years. But
again, this is a network designed to deliver a specific product, and that is
two-way simultaneous voice call; and it will not be easily modified to do
much else. This, too, is a specialized system. What is special is that
broadband data networks are both broadband and interactive. And, it is this
conjunction of attributes that creates the power broadband networks: just
about any electronic signal can be sent from anybody to anybody else.
Rather than the design of the network tying it to a specific purpose, it is a
general system, with the potential for its use to be shaped and tailored by the
needs and desires of its users.
However, all this power is of little interest unless there are people
capable of using it who find it of value to them. Prior to, say, 1992, this
defined a small community of scientists, who were computer-literate and
widely dispersed among the world's universities and research institutions,
who placed a high value on communicating with each other, and who had
access to large data sets for experimental purposes. For this group, the
Internet became integral to their research efforts. For everyone else, the
Internet was virtually unknown.
Nevertheless, the Internet has grown at an extremely rapid rate since the
late 1980s 4 and as of this writing, shows no sign of diminishing. This
extremely rapid and sustained growth has generated for the Internet enormous
press and attention by many corporations.
What was the cause of this sudden growth spurt? There is no definitive
answer, of course. However, by 1993, a number of necessary conditions
were in place:
(1) the World Wide Web (WWW), invented at Conseil Europ~en pour la
Recherche Nucleaire (CERN) in 19895 and in general use by this time;
(2) over 30% of U.S. households owned personal computers,6 generally with
an easy-to-use graphic interface (Windows or Macintosh);
(3) the ready availability of an easy-to-use graphics "browser" for the
WWW: first Mosaic, followed shortly by Netscape;
(4) sufficient information available on the WWW (data, graphics, programs,
etc.) to make it worthwhile for people to browse.
This list is certainly not exhaustive; it merely enumerates the more obvious
necessary conditions that must have been present to support the observed
growth spurt.
During 1993, there was a growing corporate involvement in the potential

4. See Mark K. Lottor, Internet Domain Survey, 10/84 - 7/95, Network Wizards, Inc.
(visited Apr. 15, 1997) <http://www.nw.com/zone/hosts-graph-linear.gif>.
5. A Little History of the World Wide Web (last modified Oct. 3, 1995) <http://www.
w3.org/pub/WWW/History.html>.
6. Andrew Freeman, Technology in Finance Survey, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1996, at 19.
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for "multimedia," a catchphrase that included video-on-demand and other
entertainment options.7 Several very large mergers were proposed, the most
publicized being the Bell Atlantic-TCI deal;' only some of these were
consummated.9 These mergers were predicated, at least in part, on the future
market potential of broadband network entertainment delivery systems."
But during this year, the Internet and WWW were not even considered worth
mentioning in the same context as the true "Information Superhighway.""
By 1994, the sustained growth of the Internet attracted more and more
users and corporations. The number of ".com" sites (indicating a commercial
user) exceeded the number of ".edu" sites (indicating an educational user) for
the first time in Internet history. 2 Both total traffic and total number of
hosts on the Internet exploded during 1994."3
Nevertheless, the Internet continued to be viewed by most large
corporations throughout 1994 and 1995 as something of a fad, the "oat bran
muffin of the 1990s." Nor was their skepticism unwarranted; having seen
several "false dawns," the unruly hackers' paradise of the Internet hardly
looked like the engine of commerce and entertainment that large corporations
envisioned as the Information Superhighway.
The highly publicized launch of Windows 95 by Microsoft in August
1995, also introduced the Microsoft Network (MSN), the world's largest
software firm's much anticipated entree into on-line services. Microsoft's
early experience with MSN, coupled with its assessment of the traditional online services market, apparently was not entirely satisfactory; in December,
Microsoft announced a major shift in strategy which would focus its
considerable resources on the Internet. This acknowledgment by the most
influential software firm in the world, that it was more profitable to cooperate
on the Internet than compete with it, marked a turning point in both public
and corporate perceptions of the future of the Internet: this was no longer
seen as another "false dawn"; the Net appeared to be here to stay. By 1996,
Microsoft had announced plans "to eliminate proprietary interfaces altogether

7. Make Way for Multimedia, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 15-16.
8. See John Huey & Andrew Kupfer, What That Merger Means for You; The Wiring
Together of Cable and Telephone by Bell Atlantic and TCI Will Be Good News for Consumers
and U.S. Competitiveness, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1993, at 82-89.
9. See Andrew Kupfer, The Baby Bells Butt Heads, FORTUNE, Mar. 21, 1994, at 76.
10. See Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations:The Regulation of Telecommunications
in an Era of Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 42-43 (1993).
11. For example, in 1993, a review article of multimedia and the "Information
Superhighway" in a well-known newsmagazine made no mention of the Internet or the
WWW. See The Tangled Webs They Weave, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 21-24.
12. See Mark K. Lottor, Internet Domain Survey (July & Oct. 1994) <http://nw.
com/zone/www-941 0/distribution.html>.
13. See id.
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and move entirely to Web-based content." 4
In sum, it now appears that the long-anticipated mass deployment of
broadband data networks is at hand, with the Internet and WWW forming the
basis of this growth. How fast this will occur; what fraction of households,
businesses, schools, and governments will eventually become active users;
what technologies will be used; and what they will be used for, are all
subjects of great uncertainty. There is a very wide range of possibilities,
from "small-impact-on-a-few-enthusiasts," to "a-fundamental-change-in-theway-we-all-live-and-work."
However, which route is taken, and how fast it develops, will almost
surely be deeply affected by public policy decisions being made now
regarding government involvement in infrastructure development, either via
direct encouragement and even investment, or via regulation, possibly with
universal service mandates.
II.

CONVERGENCE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES

For three decades, engineers and communications specialists have spoken
of the convergence of the telecommunications, computers, and entertainment
industries around the technologies of broadband networks to produce a new,
integrated industry, serving a new set of customer demands., 5 Convergence
does seem to be what is happening: telecommunications firms are seeking
partners in the entertainment business; computer firms, both hardware and
software, are seeking content providers; and cable television companies are
looking both for telephone companies and for entertainment distribution
channels. Whether such pairings will be consummated, and if consummated,
will be successful, is highly uncertain. Mergers or alliances among
established firms indeed may be how convergence is realized; but there are
other routes as well.
Complicating matters is the Internet "industry" itself: noncommercial,
based on cooperative arrangements among (largely) academics, and supported
(until quite recently) by the federal government research establishment. For
good or ill, the Internet Society16 and the Internet Engineering Task
14. Todd Spangler, The Net Grows Wider: Internet Services, PC MAG., Nov. 19, 1996,
at 148.
15. See Stavros Christodoulakis & Peter Triantafillou, Research and Development Issues
for Large-ScaleMultimedia Information Systems, 27 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 576, 576-79
(1995).
16. The Internet Society is a U.S. nonprofit organization founded in January 1992 "to
maintain and extend the development and availability of the Internet and its associated
technologies and applications." What Is the Internet Society? (last modified Apr. 8, 1997)
<http://www.isoc.org/what is/what-is-isoc.html> (providing information on this influential organization).
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Force 7 currently control the destiny of the only existing broadband data
network in the United States, indeed the world.
Each of these industries approaches this convergence with very different
expectations of what convergence actually means, and with very different
skills and attitudes towards markets and technology. From the perspective
of this article, however, the most important difference among these industries
is the degree and kind of government intervention into their markets. There
are two fundamental hypotheses which this article addresses:
(1) The convergence of these industries into a single new industry leads
ineluctably to the convergence of the public policy models for these
industries into a single new public policy model overarching this
emerging market.
(2) The speed and direction of the market convergence will be closely
coupled with the speed and direction of the public policy convergence.
Each of these industries is briefly, and somewhat arbitrarily, characterized
below, with particular but not exclusive attention to their history of
government intervention.
A.

Computer Hardware and Software

Since the early 1980s, the computer business has undergone extraordinary
changes, driven largely by extraordinary improvements in the price and
performance of microelectronic devices and the conversion to open
architectures. From a highly specialized corporate market for proprietary
systems dominated by a few firms, the industry has moved toward a mass
commodity market for open systems with many competitors in nearly every
market segment. The industry is technology- and market-driven, highly
competitive and rivalrous. There has been very little government intervention
into this market: even though IBM dominated the industry in the 1960s and
1970s, and Microsoft has approached that dominance in the late 1980s and
1990s, no government antitrust suit was prosecuted to completion against
either firm.' 8 The industry is and always has been completely unregulated.
Even its standard-setting has been negotiated without government intervention. The worldview is that this industry is highly competitive, where the
firm that best manages technology and its markets wins. Government

17. The Internet Engineering Task Force is a voluntary organization that provides a forum
for working groups to develop and select standards within the Internet protocol suite. See
IETF Overview <http://www.ietf.org> for more information on this standard-setting
organization.
18. See, e.g., Cal. Computer Prods, Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727
(9th Cir. 1979); Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.
1975). The Department of Justice entered into a consent decree with Microsoft. United States
v. Microsoft Corp., CIV.A.94-1564, 1995 WL 505998 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995).
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intervention, although occasionally requested by smaller players fearful of
dominant firms, is virtually nonexistent.
B.

Entertainment

Entertainment is a high-risk business in which vertical relationships
among content providers, for example, Disney and Paramount, and
distributors, for example, NBC and HBO, are shifting and generally
contentious. The industry is deal-driven, highly competitive, and individualistic. Government intervention has often been sought by some
players to gain a competitive advantage within their value chain. For
example, intervention was sought by entertainers at the height of the power
of network broadcasters to ensure that their rights to syndication royalties
could not be bargained away. 9 Generally, government power has been
viewed as a mechanism to advance one's own commercial interests, not as
a constraint on behavior.
C.

Telephone

Historically, the telephone industry is highly stable, with an enormous
capital base and very large cash flows. Dependability and quality of service
characterize this industry, which has historically been operations-driven.
This is the most tightly regulated of all the converging industries, with both
state and federal regulators controlling price, quality, investment, and entry
into many aspects of this industry. The process of deregulation, begun so
tentatively with the breakup of the Bell System in 1984, z0 has only
modestly freed this industry to behave competitively in certain sectors.
D. Cable Television
An industry which spent its early years in battle against the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the broadcast networks, cable
television has had a somewhat "rough and tumble" history. The late 1970s
were a period of substantial growth based on municipal franchising, an often
questionable process, followed by full deregulation by Congress in 1984.21
Rapidly increasing rates and decreasing quality of service led to voter
demand for relief, which was delivered by Congress in 1992 in the form of

19. Financial interest and syndication rules have recently changed. See Joe Flint, Facing
the Facts of Life in a Post Fin-Syn World, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 17, 1994, at 82
(describing its effect on networks and producers).
20. See, e.g., GERALD FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 94-96, 146-47 (1987).

21. See Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-573 (1996).
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re-regulation of the industry.22 Cable is short-term-financials-driven,often
dominated by the need for short-term cash flow to meet substantial debt
payments with less attention paid to longer term issues.
E. Internet
Few would actually characterize the Internet as an "industry" at all; until
quite recently, the backbone network of the U.S. Internet was owned by the
National Science Foundation. The "mid-level" networks, which served
universities, schools, governments, not-for-profits, and some technologybased firms in local geographic areas (often multistate), were owned and
managed by consortia of universities and technology firms operating in a
cooperative mode. The objective of the network managers was to support
research and education, and until quite recently, commercial traffic was not
permitted on the network for fear of compromising the cooperative, not-forprofit spirit of the Internet. Nor was there much attempt to make the Internet
easy to use; the target market was scientists and computer experts well-versed
in high-end computing, with little interest in (indeed, antagonistic to) graphic
interfaces or "easy to use" tools. The Internet was research and educationdriven. Government intervention was generally in the form of financial
support with only those regulations that the Internet community generally
supported, such as the ban on commercial use, which was implemented by
the National Science Foundation. Indeed, the privatization of the Internet in
1994 (but announced earlier) occasioned great concern that the Internet
community was being abandoned by the National Science Foundation,
perhaps being left to the not-so-tender mercies of the FCC.23
As should be evident, each of these industries about to converge have
quite different histories, different expectations, and different perspectives on
government intervention. As of this writing, there is ample evidence that
none of these industries has much understanding of the others. The Internet
community and the telephone industry, to name just one example, are in
conflict over the appropriate technology to use for very high-speed
connections, a capability both industries want and need.24 Other examples
abound. Although not germane to this article, it is worth noting that
convergence is apt to be characterized by contention and misunderstanding

22. See Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1996)).
23. See, e.g., Richard Mandelbaum & Paulette Mandelbaum, The Strategic Future of the
Mid-Level Networks, in BUoLDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTuRE 74-76, 113-16 (B. Kahin
ed., 1992) (discussing concerns about the (at the time) coming privatization of the NSFNet
backbone network).
24. Steven Steinberg, Net-Heads vs. Bell-Heads, 4 WIRED MAG. (Oct. 1996) <http://www.
hotwired.com/wired/4. 10/features/atm.htm>.
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among the principal players. There are other industries, of course, such as
cellular telephone, direct broadcast television, and other wireless technologies
that will no doubt affect, and be affected by, this convergence. But the five
listed above are most likely to be the major participants.
What are the public policy issues associated with electronic network
infrastructure? Generally, the economic issues 25 that draw governmental
attention are as follows: (1) Is the service available and affordable to all
citizens? This is generally referred to as "universal service." (2) Is the
service efficiently provided at a reasonable quality? This is generally
referred to as "quality of service." (3) Is the provider earning excess profits
from abuse of a monopoly market position? (4) Is the distribution system
available to all content providers? I will consider each in turn.
III.

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE

Each of the five industries mentioned above is network-based. Each has
achieved a substantial degree of penetration of the mass market.26 For
example, over 93% of households have telephones, over 98% of households
have television, over 90% of households are passed by cable, about twothirds of which subscribe to the service, 2 and about 40% of households
have personal computers. 21 Most every desk and workstation in U.S.
industry has a computer on it, and almost all the growth is now coming from
sales to homes, where growth rates are still high.2 9
Each industry has arguably achieved, or is about to achieve, "universal
service"; those customers who want the service are generally able to afford
it. And yet the routes they followed to achieve universal service are quite
different. In the cases of television, cellular phones, and personal computers,

25. There are a host of noneconomic issues that legislators and regulators consider in
infrastructure services, such as limiting distribution of material seen as socially pernicious
(e.g., pornographic material, instructions for making bombs, and foreign content) and
encouraging the distribution of material seen as socially beneficial (e.g., access to the Library
of Congress, educational television, and local and neighborhood content). While I recognize
the importance of these issues, I do not consider them in this article, which focuses on
economic issues only.
26. The Internet is the exception, of course. However, its phenomenal growth rate
suggests that it may eventually stabilize at relatively high penetration rates.
27. See INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DIVISION, FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE tbl. 1
(1996); see also 1995 FCC SECOND ANN. REP. ON CABLE COMPETITION, supra note 2 for
cable data.
28. See Freeman, supra note 6, at 19.
29. Even cellular telephones, once thought to be a product targeted to wealthy
stockbrokers so they could phone in buy orders and sell orders from their BMWs, have
achieved a market penetration substantially beyond what was originally predicted. In 1995,
the cellular market grew by 36% to 32 million subscribers. See INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
DIVISION, supra note 27 tbl.39. Today, it is just as likely that the person using a cellular
phone next to you in a traffic jam is driving a pickup truck, as a BMW.
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competitive markets drove prices down and market penetration up. In the
case of cable television, the laying of cable in all neighborhoods was
generally a condition of the franchise that granted each company a
geographic monopoly on wireline video delivery. In the case of telephone,
universal service was an objective of both the old Bell System and its
regulators since the early years of this century, but not to be realized until
about 1960. In cable and telephone, universal service is an explicit public
policy objective,3 ° but they use different instruments to achieve it. In
telephone, active regulation was the chosen instrument; in cable, the franchise
contract was the chosen instrument.
IV.

THE PRICE OF

MANDATED UNIVERSAL SERVICE

In both cable and telephone, however, the price of publicly mandated
universal service was monopoly. In order to make it feasible (so it was
claimed) for a firm to serve everyone, profitable and unprofitable, the
government had to forbid entry by competitors into the firm's market area.
Why should this be? The universal service mandate of regulators has
traditionally gone beyond ensuring that service is available to all. The
mandate is rather that service should be affordable by all.3"
In order to achieve this objective, regulators have traditionally insisted
on pricing practices that involve subsidies. For example, the FCC has
insisted that prices for service should be the same for all (or based on simple
criteria such as distance), regardless of cost. Telephone service in rural areas,
where it is more costly to provide, is priced no higher than service in
suburban areas, where it is less costly to provide. Long-distance telephone
service rates depend only upon the distance between the two parties having
the conversation, whether the call uses very expensive, sparse routes across
rugged terrain or relatively cheap dense routes across a plain.32
Prices for basic services, such as telephone access or basic-tier cable
television, are often subsidized by "premium" services, such as long-distance
and international telephone or premium cable channels, in order that they be
"affordable," especially for the poor.3 3 It should be noted that these pricing
practices are not unique to the United States, but occur in publicly regulated
or publicly owned networks throughout the world.34
However, such practices cannot be sustained in the presence of

30. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (1996).
31. Id. § 254(b)(1).
32. See FCC No. 96-331, IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 254(G) OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED 3-4 (1996).
33. See JACK WENDERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THEORY AND
POLICY 161-63, 173-77 (1987).
34. See ELI NOAM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 55-56 (1992).
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competitive entry. New firms could enter only those markets in which prices
are held above cost in order to subsidize other customers, forcing incumbents
to respond competitively with price decreases or lose the business altogether.
In either case, the source of internal subsidy would eventually disappear, and
the incumbent could no longer afford to serve unprofitable (though allegedly
deserving) customers. Therefore, in order to maintain the subsidies that most
regulators use to achieve universal service, regulators restrict competitive
entry, either by regulatory fiat or by the granting of franchise monopoly.
As a matter of logic, a public policy of universal service need not
necessarily lead to franchise monopoly. For example, the market could be
open to competition, but some form of direct subsidy from the government,
either to customers (such as "telephone stamps" to poor or rural subscribers)
or to firms (such as the small-city subsidies that the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) gave to serving airlines), would also achieve universal service.
However, a direct subsidy has two political drawbacks: (1) it is an explicit
on-budget government expenditure, rather than an implicit industryimplemented internal subsidy; and (2) it would make the subsidy more
explicit, and thus subject to potential criticism. Few regulators have used this
mechanism (save the CAB in a previous era), favoring the less visible
industry cross-subsidy approach.
The costs of regulated monopoly have been well-documented elsewhere,3 5 including reduced incentives for efficient operation, reduced
incentives for innovation, excessive resources devoted to "rent-seeking"
through the regulatory process, and so forth. There is no question that
paying the price of monopoly is quite high; but is it really necessary in order
to achieve universal service?
Several scholars have disputed the assertion that the granting of
monopoly franchises was necessary in order to induce cable operators to
enter the market and provide ubiquitous coverage.36 They argue that
granting monopolies is simply bad public policy.37 Of course, any firm
would like a monopoly and will demand that one be given to it as a
condition of investment, but is it necessary in order to get cable deployment?
These scholars marshal evidence that there are cities in which cable operators
compete, and it seems to work. Others argue that the risks of extensive
infrastructure investment are just too great to be left to the competitive
35. See generally RONALD BRAUETIGAM & BRUCE OWEN, THE REGULATION GAME:
STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINIsTRATIVE PROCESS (1978) (an early reference).

36. See, e.g., Tom Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television, 7 YALE J. REG.
65 (1990); Stanford Levin & John Meisel, Cable Television and Competition, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y, Dec. 1991, at 521-22.
37. See Stanford Levin & John Meisel, Cable Television and Competition, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y, Dec. 1991, at 521-22; Tom Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable

Television, 7 YALE J. REG. 65 (1990).
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market, and that no firm will take that risk unless assured of a reasonable
return.38
The core of the universal service problem for "hard" network infrastructure, however, is simply the magnitude of the investment required. This
investment is best conceived as having a network component (switching,
transmission, computers, head-end, long-haul satellite, etc.) and an access
component (local loop, inside wire, etc.). The network component is
typically a shared resource; many users make use of switches and transmission systems. The access component is typically not shared, but dedicated
to a single household.39 Moreover, the access component, sometimes
referred to as "the last mile," may account for as much as half the total
investment in the network. Capital cost of a traditional telephone access line
is typically estimated at around $1,000.40
Every customer, therefore,
represents a substantial financial commitment by the serving firm.
V.

THE PROBLEM OF QUALITY OF SERVICE

In a market with some form of competition, the expectation is that
quality of service will take care of itself. Firms will provide the level of
quality that customers demand and are willing to pay for, and competition
will ensure their responsiveness to customers. In the case of monopoly,
however, the incentives for the firm to provide appropriate quality levels may
be diminished, so that quality of service may suffer. The most salient
examples of quality-of-service problems in these network industries have
occurred in the more monopolistic industries: cable television and the
Internet.
The recent congestion on the Internet is less a problem of monopoly than
it is of growth outstripping the Internet's governance structure. WWW users
have been experiencing agonizingly slow download times from graphicsintensive web servers, and the delays from U.S. sites to European or Asian
sites are extremely long. Since the network uses shared resources, increased
demands cause those shared resources to become congested. Management
of this situation is at once everyone's problem and no one's problem; both

38. Virginia M. Kahn, How Safe Is Cable's NaturalMonopoly?, CABLEVIsIoN, Oct. 13,
1986, at 61.
39. This is much less of a problem with connections to medium to large businesses, in
which the businesses provide substantial "cooperating" investment in telephone equipment on
their own premises, so that a dedicated access circuit group to a business is a less risky
investment for the local telephone company. For households, however, the access investment
is often made prior to the household making consumption choices or cooperative investments.
40. ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAvERMAN, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
TALK IS CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 82-85 (1995). Crandall and Waverman estimate the annualized capital cost of

the access line to be around $100. Id.
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demand and supply of all network components, not just a few, must be
managed to solve this quality-of-service problem.
The decline of service quality of another kind was observed by many
customers of the cable television industry during the late 1980s and gave rise
to demands on Congress for a solution. That solution was the Cable
Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992. 4' However,
the political demand grew out of what many customers perceived as shoddy
treatment in handling requests and complaints and failure to provide reliable,
outage-free services.
In principle, regulators generally have the legal power to coerce firms to
provide the "right" service level. In practice, this is more difficult, as is
borne out in Williamson's well-known analysis of cable television franchise
bidding. 2 Additionally, it is not clear that regulators are good at assessing
the quality level that customers would demand in a more competitive market.
For example, in the precompetitive airline market, most scholars agree that
airlines over-provided schedule quality, at the cost of higher fares, as a result
of the CAB's regulatory practices. 3 After deregulation, many more routes
involved hub-and-spoke connections and fewer nonstop connections, reducing
schedule quality to that for which customers were willing to pay. 4 Another
example occurred in the telephone industry. Prior to the deregulation of
terminal equipment, the Bell System, with regulatory approval, provided
After
rather simple telephones that were virtually indestructible. 45
deregulation, it became clear that most customers preferred telephones with
many more features and a shorter life; the telephone soon became another
consumer electronics product. 46 In both cases, regulation led to an inappropriate quality level, as measured against the competitive standard. 7
VI.

THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY

Many consider network infrastructure to be a "natural monopoly," an
industry in which competitive markets would naturally lead to a single
supplier as the most efficient alternative. In such cases, antitrust actions to
break up a monopoly would be ineffective, as market forces would eventually

41. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
(1996)).
42. Oliver Williamson, FranchiseBiddingfor NaturalMonopolies - In General and with
Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 82, 99 (1976).
43. Steven Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Economic Effects ofAirline Deregulation,
in STUDIES IN THE REGULATION OF EcONOMIc ACTIVITY 4 (1986).
44. Id. at 5-6.
45. Gerald R. Faulhaber, Public Policy in Telecommunications: The Third Revolution, 7
INF. ECON. & POL'Y 251, 261 (1995).
46. See id.
47. See id.
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lead to the remonopolization of the industry. Some form of regulation may
be justified as a means to control the abuse of monopoly power in such
industries, and this is the rationale given by many for the creation of
regulated monopolies in network industries.4" Others argue that these
monopolies may not be so natural, but are in fact products of the regulation
that seeks to control them. 49 This latter view is somewhat more compelling,
in that virtually all regulators protect regulated monopolies with entry
prohibitions. In the words of Alfred Kahn, "If competitors want to enter,
how natural can monopoly be?"" ° In fact, the protection is necessary to
maintain subsidizing price structures, which are indeed a product of
regulation. In any case, regulators find that control of monopoly power is
added to their list of responsibilities, be that monopoly natural or created.
Generally, much regulatory attention is devoted to determining if a firm is
abusing its market power. In the classic regulated monopoly, this concern
takes the form of ensuring that the firm's earnings are not "excessive," that
is, do not exceed the cost of capital. In regulated monopolies operating in
some markets subject to competition, this concern takes the form of ensuring
that power in monopoly markets is not being used to subsidize operations in
competitive markets. Both tasks are extremely difficult, but concern for cross
subsidy is virtually impossible. For example, as telecommunications
competition slowly increased during the 1970s and early 1980s, the FCC
devoted very substantial efforts to develop an accounting standard by which
to judge whether or not the Bell System rates involved cross subsidy,5'
although without notable success.
VII.

THE PROBLEM OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION
(CONTENT VS. CONDUIT)

The "network" of a network industry is a distribution system, a conduit
over which something else, content, is sent. In telecommunications, this
something is telephone calls; in cable, it is video programming; in electric
utilities, it is power. In computing, it is possible to think of hardware as
conduit and software (which actually delivers what customers want) as
content. In both regulated and competitive markets, an important economic
issue is the vertical integration of content and conduit.
In some markets such as telephone, content and conduit are separated as

48. ALFRED E. KAHN, I THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
11(1970).
49. Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation,
in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON MICROECONOMIC ACTIvITY 4-5 (1989).
50. ALFRED E. KAHN, 2 THE ECoNOMICs OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
146 (1971).

51.

FAULHABER,

supra note 20, at 64-65.
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a matter of law, generally on First Amendment grounds.52 In other related
markets such as cable and broadcast television, content and conduit can be,
and generally are, integrated within each firm. 3 For example, a subscriber
to a particular cable firm can only buy material that the cable firm chooses
to make available. In contrast, anyone can use the telephone network to
distribute any information, such as 800
or 900 services; and the telephone
54
company has nothing to say about it.
The computer industry provides a prime example of how competitive
markets evolve. Prior to the early 1980s, virtually all computer companies
bundled hardware and software together. An IBM customer had to buy IBM
proprietary software, because no other commercially available software ran
on IBM machines. This was the era of "closed" computer architecture. In
contrast, the PC ushered in the era of "open" architecture, in which hardware
vendors encouraged provision of software by as many firms as possible. The
result was a flowering of both hardware and software, with thousands of
companies, many no more than a single person, pumping out tens of
thousands of software titles. Many have credited this open architecture with
the extraordinary growth and richness of the computer industry of the 1980s
and 1990s,5 compared to the relatively stately pace of innovation in the
closed architecture era. However, many software firms have complained that
Microsoft, the firm that controls the dominant PC operating system (the
conduit), has used its operating system control as an unfair competitive
advantage in the applications (content) market, such as word processors,
spreadsheets, and presentation graphics. 6
After considering such
complaints, the Department of Justice did not prosecute, reaching a relatively
mild agreement with Microsoft that it cease certain practices. 7 No one
seriously suggests that Microsoft should not be permitted to compete in the
applications software market. However, the example brings home the fact

52. For example, when granting applications for international common carrier certification,
the FCC inserts the following clause: "[Common carrier] will act as an objective conduit of
its customers' communications without influence or control in determining the content or the
destination of the calls." Overseas Common Carrier Section 214 Application Actions Taken,
11 F.C.C.R. 10,080 (1996).
53. This is not to say that cable or broadcast firms actually produce their own content
(although broadcasters do produce their own news shows), but rather that they control the
content, which they generally purchase from outside, entertainment suppliers.
54. See supra note 52 and accompanying text for an example of the FCC's stance.
55. M. Kapor, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Building the Open Road: The NREN as
Test-Bed for the National Public Network (last modified September 1991) <http://www.uio.
no/-elund/rfc/1259.txt>.
56. James Gleick, Making Microsoft Safe for Capitalism, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1995, § 6
(Magazine), at 50.
57. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., CIV.A.94-1564, 1995 WL 505998 (D.D.C. Aug.
21, 1995).

234

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

that vertical integration of content and conduit is certain to give rise to the
contention of market abuses, if not actual abuses, and constitutes a public
policy problem, either regulatory or antitrust.
In sum, universal service with appropriate service quality, control of
monopoly pricing, and open architectures can be achieved with competitive
markets, at least in some cases. However, regulation/franchise control have
traditionally been the chosen instruments in virtually all electronic network
infrastructure industries. In the case of broadband networks the question is,
which is the more appropriate means of achieving the public policy
objectives? It is this question to which I now turn.
The four issues raised in the previous section present an interrelated set
of problems for which various interest groups expect a public policy
response. Fortunately, Congress, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,58
established a procompetitive context in which state regulators and legislators,
as well as federal regulators, can respond. However, control of telecommunications in the United States is fragmented among fifty-two local
jurisdictions, plus the federal level, suggesting that progress within this
framework and the policies adopted may be quite varied, even contradictory.
The process by which the individual states and the nation as a whole come
to understand what needs to be done is likely to be drawn out over the better
part of a decade, after which there will no doubt continue to be some
variation among jurisdictions. The focus of this article is on the economic
issues, not the jurisdictional issues.
VIII.

UNIVERSAL SERVICE

The universal service issue for broadband two-way networks is currently
relatively quiescent. Recent action by the FCC, in conjunction with state
regulators, has been to implement a mechanism to ensure advanced
broadband access for the nation's schools.59 Generally, however, few have
supported a universal service concept of a broadband link into every home
in the United States, an enormously capital-intensive venture. Restricting the
universal service concept to below-cost provision of broadband to schools,
and possibly libraries, ensures that this will be a non issue.
However, this may change if there is a substantial increase in the demand
for broadband in rural areas or from disadvantaged groups. This demand
would translate into political action that could redefine universal service to
include broadband, possibly fiber, to the home or curb. Should this occur

58. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1996)).
59. Pamela Mendels, FCC Moves to Ensure Net Access for Schools, N.Y. TIMEs,
CYBERTIMES (Nov.
13,
1996) <http://search.nytimes.com/web/docsroot/
library/cyber/week/ 1Il3fcc.htm>.
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relatively soon, before the industry has a chance to form, there could well be
public intervention to ensure that all suppliers are required to provide fiber
service to all households and businesses. In fact, if municipalities are
permitted to limit broadband fiber providers by monopoly franchising, as has
been done in cable television, this outcome is highly likely. Even more
likely is that those firms who believe they have a good chance of winning
such monopoly franchises may press legislators toward universal service as
a means of justifying monopoly. It could be argued, as above, that only
monopoly can ensure that everyone will be served.
Should this occur, it will almost surely be a substantial loss to the nation,
for the following reasons:
(1) The track record of regulated/franchised monopoly in fostering
product innovation has been particularly poor. In the emerging broadband
network industry, this form of innovation will be particularly important.
Since no one now knows what services will emerge that will capture the
interests of consumers, it is essential that firms be permitted to explore the
possibilities, that consumers have the maximum choices, and that the market
be permitted to evolve in as free and open a fashion as possible. Imposing
regulation/franchised monopoly on this market will surely throttle this needed
innovative process, substituting (whether intended or not) the visible hand of
government for the invisible one of the market.
(2) There is an existing infrastructure for delivering Internet-type services
to everyone. Most schools and libraries have some form of access, and most
households have telephones, which permit 28.8 Kbps access, which is
satisfactory if not perfect for Internet access, at least at present.
(3) There is little evidence that broadband access from the home, as
opposed to broadband access from the school or 28.8 Kbps access from the
home, constitutes an essential tool for all Americans to achieve equal
opportunities, either in the political or the economic marketplace. It could,
of course, become a valued entertainment distribution channel, but this is
hardly a public policy reason to subsidize universal service.
If regulated monopoly is a poor policy choice, is it at least better than
competition? A unique feature of the emerging broadband technologies is
that there are so many of them. While much attention has been focused on
fiber, both satellite delivery as well as various "add-on" technologies for
telephone and cable are also competitors to fiber for broadband.6" This
potential for intermodal competition changes the nature of the market
Preliminary
alternative to franchised/regulated wireline monopoly.6
60. See David Strom, Breaking the Internet Speed Barrier,WNDOwS SOURCES 1-3 (June
17, 1996) <http://www.zdnet.com/wsources/content/960617/feature.html>.
61. It also is worth noting that developing countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia,
poised to expand their telephone networks, do not plan on using wireline technology to
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for broadband access has shown the following
research on competition
62
tentative results:
(1) For "reasonable" estimates of cost and demand for broadband
distribution, it appears likely that major metropolitan areas may support
more than one fiber distributor.
(2) However, competitive deployment of fiber may occur in "rings," in
which the areas of most dense population are served by n fiber
distributors, and the less dense areas are served by n-1 distributors, until
the final ring, which is served by only one provider. Prices within each
ring would reflect competitive conditions. The least dense areas may not
be served by fiber at all.
(3) Most likely, satellite services would also serve metropolitan areas in
competition with fiber,63 albeit with a service that is somewhat inThese services would cover the whole population, thus
ferior.'
achieving universal service via competition.
However, at least some legislators and regulators find it difficult to
refrain from intervention, if only to "help" competition to achieve public
policy objectives. Some have suggested an intermediate approach that would
permit public policymakers to show a commitment to universal service while
encouraging competition. Municipalities could offer nonexclusive franchises,
on the condition that franchise holders would be required to provide universal
service. Entry would require a franchise, but anyone could obtain a franchise
for the asking. This could encourage competition among broadband fiber
firms, all of which would be forced to serve all customers. In this way, not
only would everyone enjoy the benefits of broadband, but they would also

provide universal service, but intend to rely on (indeed, are relying on) cellular and other
wireless services to provide services to rural areas. The presence of both wired and wireless
modes has changed the nature of the universal service problem in these countries. See Peter
Haynes, The End of the Line: A Survey of Telecommunications, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1993,
at 1, 7.
62. Gerald R. Faulhaber & Christiaan Hogendom, Competition for Broadband Electronic
Distribution: Feasibility of Open Markets and Universal Service, Annenberg Public Policy
Center, Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania (work in progress,
available June 1997).
63. Recently, Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) distribution of video entertainment, a direct
competitor to cable television, has had some success in penetrating markets already served by
cable. See Mark Robichaux, Once a Laughingstock, Direct-Broadcast TV Gives Cable a
Scare, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1996, at Al, A10.
64. Satellite can be used for broadband distribution to the customer. However, without
expensive transmitting equipment and much more bandwidth than is currently available,
customers would be required to transmit signals from the home via telephone lines. This
service would be broadband in and narrowband out, as compared with fiber, which can handle
two-way broadband. On the other hand, fiber to the curb is not yet a reality, while satellite
systems delivering a 400Kbps downlink can be purchased today. See Jeffrey G. Witt, Hughes
Networks on The FinalFrontier,PC MAG., June 25, 1996, at NE23-24.
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enjoy the benefits of competition as well.
Unfortunately, this happy outcome may never occur. The requirement
service imposes a fixed cost on entrants which would constrain
universal
for
the number of fiber providers who would be willing to enter with a universal
service constraint. Simulations based on the aforementioned preliminary
research suggest that even if a competitive market could support multiple
fiber providers, an open market with a universal service obligation may be
able to support only one supplier. The reason is that the cost of supplying
fiber infrastructure to unprofitable customers may be greater than even
duopoly profits from the profitable markets. Thus, imposing the universal
service obligation may actually lead to monopoly, even if unconstrained
competition could support multiple fiber vendors. Of course, the price
charged under this scenario would be a monopoly price, substantially higher
than most customers would pay under unconstrained competition. The only
constraint on monopoly pricing in this scenario would be the presence of
satellite services, should satellite vendors choose to, and be permitted to,
compete.
On balance, then, it would appear that competitive provision of
broadband access is far superior to any form of regulation or franchising.
Further, unless there is significant pressure from rural or disadvantaged
groups for below-cost provision of broadband access to the home, it should
be relatively easy for legislators, regulators, and municipalities to resist
vendor demands for monopoly franchises. The policy direction established
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 should provide a rationale for
policymakers to take the competitive option.
IX.

QUALITY OF SERVICE

The evolution of the Internet into the two-way broadband network of the
future has been both exciting and painful. The network itself, its administrative support, and its governance structure were all designed for a
much different environment. Institutions and infrastructure designed to meet
the needs of university researchers around the world are quite unsuitable for
the high-growth, high-volume, commercialized mass-market service the
Internet has become in the last year. What is amazing is not that the Internet
is congested, which it clearly is,65 but that it has not collapsed under the
crushing weight of unprecedented traffic volumes. The problem is clear:
investment in Internet capacity has not kept pace with the growth of demand,
leading to a slow-down of the Internet. In some places, such as transoceanic
traffic, and for some uses, such as telnet and real-time video, this increase in

65. See Why the Net Should Grow Up, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1996, at 17-18.
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congestion has made the Internet almost unusable.'
Does this call for a public policy intervention? The Clinton administration has established an Information Infrastructure Task Force,67 with
committees, working groups, events, speeches, and testimony.68 The current
Internet Engineering Task Force is comfortable working with government
agencies, so this may help. However, any long-term solution will clearly
involve three factors:
(1) An overhaul of the Internet's governance structure. While research and
education should continue to have strong representation in governance,
commercial users and vendors will eventually take on more governance
responsibility.
(2) Pricingand revenue sharing. This is probably the most immediate need
of the Internet, in order to ensure that those who own facilities, such as
transmission pipes, servers, and routers, have sufficient incentive to
invest in new capacity to handle increased traffic volumes.69 Such
arrangements exist in virtually every commercial network industry in
which multiple entities are responsible for different parts of a single
network: railroads and telecommunications are two obvious examples.
Such arrangements need to be adopted by the Internet, and relatively
quickly.
(3) Development and integration of new networks. It is likely that several
Intemets may develop and coexist, interconnected with gateways that
limit the impact of congestion between networks. In October 1996, a
group of American universities announced their intention to set up
"Internet II" as a means of avoiding increased congestion and ensuring
that this network would enable them to meet their education and research
objectives. It is likely that other groups may wish to do the same in
order to meet their objectives. Certainly the recent trend toward
corporate "intranets" is best viewed in this light; they are networks that
share the protocols of the Internet without sharing its congestion and lack
of security.
Clearly, government can play a role in helping this happen. It is most
likely that existing institutions can evolve toward the above solutions, albeit
with some pain and contention. Government can play a supporting role here.
However, should government attempt to play a directive role, it is more
likely to be the problem, not the solution. In the early 1990s, the National
Science Foundation correctly perceived that its role in providing the NSFNet

66. See Too Cheap to Meter?,

ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1996, at 23-27.
67. Exec. Order No. 12,864, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,773 (1993).
68. As befits such an organization, its primary point of contact is its website:

<http://iitf.doc.gov>.
69. See Too Cheap to Meter?, supra note 66, at 23.
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backbone was over, and that this role should be taken over by the private
sector. Despite many protestations from the Internet community, the National
Science Foundation implemented this privatization.7" It would be inappropriate if the government were to step back into a directive role, having
had the good sense to withdraw from such a role some years ago.
X.

MONOPOLY AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION

There is a reasonable chance that limited competition in broadband may
emerge. Not only might there be more than one fiber provider, there is likely
to be satellite coverage as well. Further, existing infrastructure providers are
currently developing technologies that increase the effective bandwidth of
their infrastructure. Cable firms are experimenting with cable modems,
which promise in-bound speeds of 10 Mbps, although there is some concern
over how much bandwidth cable systems have for heavy Internet usage.
Telephone companies are experimenting with Asynchronous Digital
Subscriber Line, a technology that will permit 10 Mbps in-bound over
existing telephone lines. All these technologies will compete with each other,
provided they are deployed.
And therein lies the concern. It is possible, some would say likely, that
after all the grand announcements, alliances, initial public offerings, and other
fanfare, only the telephone companies will actually lay fiber to the curb, and
thereby control the one broadband two-way distribution channel into the
home. In that case, two problems confront public policymakers. The first
is the classic problem of monopoly: a firm takes advantage of its market
position to charge prices higher than costs. The second is the problem of
access control: the monopoly firm chooses the content its users can access,
which limits both its customers as well as potential suppliers. Monopolies
tend to be closed architecture systems, with a limited choice controlled by the
"bottleneck" supplier.
On balance, it is likely that the second problem would be more serious
than the first. If it is the case that the market can only support a single
supplier, then it is likely that monopoly prices are not very much higher than
total costs; if they were, then the market could support more than one
supplier. Of course, it could be that the monopoly may be a temporary one,
until other firms can deploy resources to compete. In this case, it is
particularly important that antitrust authorities be alert to attempts by the
incumbent to raise potential rivals' entry costs and other anticompetitive
behavior. In any case, this would appear to be a problem for the antitrust
authorities.
The second problem is somewhat more difficult. Should a single firm
70. Mandelbaun & Mandelbaun, supra note 23, at 74-76.
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be the monopoly supplier of broadband distribution, it is likely to control
content, increasing its profits through price discrimination among content
providers. By analogy with the IBM-dominated computer market of the
1970s, we would expect proprietary content provision in a closed architecture, without the profusion of content and access that a more competitive
market would provide. If such a monopoly emerges, or emerges even
temporarily, how should policymakers respond?7 1
The problem is closely related to two issues in telecommunications today:
(1) encouraging local telephone competition, a market now dominated by the
Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs); and (2) ensuring that RBOC
provision of video services is open to nonRBOC content providers. Both
issues are before regulatory commissions as of this writing, and broadly
similar approaches are being taken. In the case of local competition, RBOCs
are being required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to open their
networks to potential competitors who wish to lease facilities to provide local
service.72 Originally, the FCC mandated wholesale rates at which the
RBOC would be required to provide local facilities;73 however, this
requirement was struck down on a challenge by state regulators on
jurisdictional grounds.
Nonetheless, state regulators are arbitrating
agreements between RBOCs and potential competitors for wholesale rates
close to the FCC guidelines.7 4 The concept of the Act was to mandate
resale of bottleneck facilities to encourage competitive supply of local
telephone service.7 5
Similarly, in the case of video services, several interested parties were
concerned that the provision of these services could become a distribution
monopoly, with the fiber becoming a bottleneck facility.76 To address this
problem, the FCC has adopted the Open Video Systems (OVS) approach, in
which telephone companies, indeed, any OVS supplier providing video
distribution to the home is required to provide access to any content provider
that wishes to use the supplier's capacity under the same terms and

71. The following analysis draws on James Kaplan, Integration, Competition, and Industry
Structure in Broadband Communications (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Wharton School Advanced Study Project, Wharton School, Public Policy & Management
Department).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 259 (1996).
73. Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio
Service Providers, FCC No. 96-325, CC Docket No. 95-185 (1996) (first report and order).
74. Roger Fillion, Phone Market Competition Proceeds- Not as Planned,REUTERs Bus.
REP. (Nov. 13, 1996) <http://www2.elibrary.com/getdoc.cgi?id=5...pubname=Reuters_
BusinessReport&puburl=O>.
75. Implementation of Infrastructure Sharing Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-456, FCC 96-456, at 1-2 (proposed Nov. 22, 1996).
76. Open Video Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,698 § 117, at 64 (June 5, 1996) (second report
and order).
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conditions that it supplies its own content provider.77 In this model, the
facilities supplier is not enjoined from providing content; but it is required
to make its facilities available to other content providers under the same
terms and conditions it offers its own content provider.78 While this
approach is not without problems, it does represent a regulatory approach to
convert an otherwise bottleneck facility into an open architecture system.
In fact, the OVS is a good example of a regulatory intervention that
opens up markets to a far richer supply structure than would otherwise be
obtainable, and certainly far richer than would be obtainable under traditional
Should temporary
rate-base and rate-of-return monopoly regulation.
monopoly of two-way broadband facilities become a problem, then this
relatively light touch of regulation designed to open access to any content
provider is an effective solution to that problem.
The history of network infrastructure supply in the United States, and
indeed the world, is one of unrelenting regulated monopoly. I have argued
in this article that adopting such a model for two-way broadband networks
is likely to throttle innovation and deliver only a very small fraction of the
content that would be interchanged in a more open market. Ensuring that
this historical public policy solution is not imposed on this exciting and
uncertain enterprise is perhaps the most important public policy issue for the
electronic age of the next century.
Fortunately, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 set a highly procompetitive strategic direction for public policymakers 9 that federal and state
regulators, as well as state legislators, appear to be following. Calls for
broadband universal service appear to be limited to schools, health care
providers, and libraries, an enterprise well within the capabilities of the
emerging industry to handle. The FCC's OVS approach to handling
bottleneck broadband facilities shows promise of providing more open
architectures, even under conditions of facilities monopoly. The willingness
of state regulators to permit competition with "their" local telephone
companies is a welcomed break from the past. Competition among
broadband access providers appears possible; whether municipalities are
willing to give up franchise control of video distribution has yet to be tested.
Indeed, this trend toward open competition, which appears so robust as
of this writing, is likely to be rather fragile, cutting against the historical
grain of American regulation of network infrastructure. Past attempts at
deregulation in this industry have not fared well. Cable television,
deregulated in 1984, is the best example of how an industry made re-

77. Id. § 7, at 7-8.
78. First Report & Order, supra note 73 §§ 682-703, at 342-51.
79. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6) (1996).
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regulation an attractive option to a country steeped in the tradition of
competition. A major setback, a public relations fiasco, or overly aggressive
monopolists could reverse this current trend toward reliance upon competitive
markets, leading the nation back to regulated monopoly, which may well
smother this exciting and promising, but yet infant, industry in its crib.

